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Abstract:  All outbreaks of infectious intestinal disease reported to the authorities were 
entered on a computer database with outbreak control teams being established to investigate 
larger or more significant incidents. The outbreak database and, when set up, the notes of 
outbreak team meetings were examined for the 279 outbreaks reported in a three-year period 
(2003-2005). Faeces specimens submitted as part of an outbreak were examined for 
microbial pathogens and the results cross-matched to the outbreak number. Almost half of 
the general outbreaks reported (137) occurred in long-term care facilities for the elderly, 51 
outbreaks were recorded in hospitals and 31 occurred in the wider community. In 76 
outbreaks no specimen was logged. A microbial cause was confirmed in about one-third of 
outbreaks, with noroviruses being the most common (19%). Salmonellas accounted for 12 of 
the 21 community outbreaks linked to social events and all were foodborne. Suggestions for 
improving notification and surveillance are discussed. 
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1. Introduction  
Infectious intestinal disease is common and the majority of cases go unreported. One study, based 
on 70 general practices across England, found that 1 in 6 patients presented to their general practitioner 
and that only a small proportion of these had pathogens isolated and were captured by national 
laboratory surveillance [1].
 Larger outbreaks and those with more severe illnesses are more likely to be 
reported, and smaller incidents of mild disease or infections that spread slowly in a community may 
well be missed [2]. In the UK surveillance is largely based on laboratory confirmed cases where 
isolates have been sent to the reference laboratory for further typing and clusters have been identified. 
Surveillance of Salmonella and Verocytotoxin-producing Escherichia coli O157 infections based on 
laboratory isolates is now established (Enter-net) and this facilitates the investigation of international 
outbreaks caused by these pathogens [3]. 
Although most cases of gastrointestinal infection are self-limiting, some, particularly in the very 
young or old and those with underlying disease can be serious and even life-threatening [4]. Episodes 
of diarrhea can lead to subsequent ill health with the risk of complications being highly dependent on 
the infecting organism [5]. Alongside these potential health problems there are substantial social and 
economic costs [6], which intensify the need for improving surveillance and reducing the burden of 
intestinal infection. Knowing the location of incidents and identifying the causative organism facilitate 
better control and help target appropriate preventative measures. 
Initial reporting by persons made ill, by owners/managers of a business involved, or by family 
doctors after seeing an ill patient is actively encouraged by staff from local authorities and Health 
Protection Units (HPUs), however, it is not mandatory and undoubtedly many outbreaks are missed. 
Some incidents may be recognized as clusters following an unexpected increase in laboratory isolates 
or after typing by a reference laboratory. In the Health Protection Agency North-East Region all 
outbreaks reported are recorded on a database held at both the Regional HPA Laboratory at Newcastle 
and the HPA commissioned laboratory at Middlesbrough. The present study seeks to examine data 
from outbreaks reported over a three-year period (2003 to 2005) to the laboratory at Middlesbrough. 
The aim is to study the outcomes and limitations of the present reporting system and to consider any 
options that might improve outbreak surveillance.  
2. Experimental Section  
2.1. The Database 
The database is part of an intranet site operated by the HPA North-East region. Entry to the site is 
password protected and laboratory staff are responsible for entering the data onto the system. At 
present two laboratories are using the site with the system electronically generating the next available 
four digit number called the incident number (ILOG) when data has been entered and the screen 
prompt pressed. Details of an outbreak can be updated when more information becomes available by 
calling up the relevant ILOG number on the system. As well as the location of the incident, the name of 
the person notifying the outbreak, the local authority (unless within a hospital), the symptoms, and the 
date of onset are entered. The numbers of people thought to be exposed to the source (if known) 
together with those who were actually ill are also recorded. Whenever the source and/or the number of Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 6          
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people exposed are unknown this is noted in a comments section on the ILOG form as a prompt for 
updating, if possible, at a later date. Each suspected outbreak is classified according to one of the 
following locations:- hospital, nursing or residential home, child care, adult day care, social occasion, 
school, retail premises, private residence, workplace and countryside. Space is also provided to record 
the causative organism. When the outbreak has stopped (either after closure by the outbreak team or 
after a period of one month without a specimen being submitted) the status is changed from ongoing to 
complete and the information is then filed. A search facility is built into the system and various entry 
points can be used to search the database. 
Once an ILOG number has been set up the information is also entered into the microbiology 
laboratory computer system. This allows the ILOG number to be recorded at the time of specimen 
entry. The pathology computer system (APEX) has a search facility so that the results of all specimens 
logged to the outbreak can be viewed. 
2.2. Reporting of Outbreaks 
In this study an outbreak was defined as two or more cases of infectious intestinal disease linked by 
time and space. We excluded those outbreaks that were confined to persons living in the same 
household, unless the source was thought to be outside the home and other people might also have been 
exposed. Suspected outbreaks that took place in Tees Valley and County Durham (population 
approximately 1.1 million) or that occurred in patients in the James Cook University Hospital at 
Middlesbrough (acute hospital with approximately 1,000 beds) were included. Community outbreaks 
were reported to the laboratory by either CCDCs or nursing staff in a Health Protection Unit or by 
Environmental Health or Technical officers working for a local authority. In hospital, nurses in 
infection control or the Infection Control Doctor flagged up outbreaks. Early reporting was encouraged 
so that specimens are not lost to the system. When an outbreak was reported it provided an opportunity 
for the CCDC and microbiologist to discuss the likely pathogens and consider what pathogens should 
be looked for and the timing of results.  
Reporting outbreaks to responsible authorities is voluntary. This means that investigation is patchy 
depending on both the action of those diagnosing or experiencing symptoms and on the number of 
persons ill and the severity of the symptoms. When alerted responsible authorities take action based on 
both the information received and on that gained by questioning those involved. The Consultant in 
Communicable Disease Control (CCDC) is responsible for setting up an Outbreak Control Team when 
more detailed investigation is needed either because of the severity or high number of cases or the need 
to establish control measures and prevent repeat episodes. The team includes as a minimum staff from 
the local authority, microbiology laboratory and the Health Protection Unit (HPU).  
2.3. Microbiological Examination 
For bacteriological tests the standard operating procedures described by the Heath Protection 
Agency were used. For faeces specimens the bacteria routinely looked for included Salmonellas, 
Shigellas,  Campylobacters, and Escherichia coli O157, with other bacteria being added when 
foodborne or waterborne disease was suggested and the recorded symptoms and incubation period 
indicated that these might be important. As appropriate further identification and typing was performed Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 6          
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at the HPA Centre for Infections in Colindale, London. Specimens were screened for crytosporidia by 
Auramine staining. Microscopic examination for other ova and cysts was performed on request. The 
enzyme immunoassay (EIA) kit from Premier was used to screen specimens for toxins A and B of 
Clostridium difficile. Testing for adenovirus (EIA Premier) astrovirus (EIA Dako), norovirus (EIA 
Dako), and rotavirus (EIA Dako) was carried out. Generally six specimens (when available) were 
tested for viruses, and whenever two or more patients were positive, no further specimens were 
screened. Faeces were referred to the Regional HPA Laboratory at Leeds for electron microscopy if no 
agent had been identified and an infectious cause was still suspected.  
2.4. Routine Laboratory Surveillance 
The results of positive cultures for gastrointestinal bacterial pathogens and positive tests for viruses 
obtained at Middlesbrough were routinely notified via the Co-Surv system to the Communicable 
Disease Surveillance Centre at Colindale, London. A search of this system identified how many of 
these organisms were reported by the laboratory during the three-year period. For noroviruses the time 
period was limited to April 2004 to December 2005 and this coincided with the introduction of the 
immunoassay system to detect this virus. Cross-reference to the pathology computer system (APEX) 
was used to determine whether or not follow up specimens had been sent for campylobacter and 
salmonella positives. 
3. Results and Discussion  
3.1. Case Reporting 
Table 1 shows the organisms routinely reported by the Middlesbrough laboratory in the three-year 
study period. Of the 218 Salmonella isolates reported 61 were identified as being part of outbreaks. 
Although 813 Campylobacters were reported, none was part of an outbreak. Overall C. difficile toxins 
were the most common finding (1,092 reports), with most infections occurring in elderly care hospital 
wards or in nursing/residential homes. Laboratory investigation for viruses was limited to specific 
requests or suspected outbreaks.  
Table 1. Routine notifications of enteric pathogens by Middlesbrough Microbiology 
Laboratory, 2003-2005. 
 
Year  Organism 
  Campylobacter
 
Salmonella 
(enteritidis) 
Shigella  C. difficile 
toxins 
E. coli 
O157 
Crypto 
sporidium 
Astrovirus  Norovirus  Rotavirus 
2003  259  86 (57)  1  233  0  42  35  NA*  164 
2004  258  56 (34)  2  327  1  19  34  53  120 
2005  296  76 (48)  1  532  1  25  50  96  122 
 
Total  813  218(139)  4  1092  2  86  119  149  406 
* Not available in first year as only recorded after introduction of immunoassay method Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 6          
 
 
551
3.2. Outbreaks Reported 
At the time of this study outbreaks in the UK were not all routinely reported to national surveillance. 
Reporting was limited to laboratory-confirmed outbreaks (reported manually using a standard outbreak 
form) and to typing results, usually Salmonellas or E. coli O157, routinely sent from the reference 
laboratory to the national surveillance centre.  
The highest monthly reports of enteric pathogens occurred during November and December 2004 
and January 2005. The same seasonal affect was not as apparent in the two other years. The Winter 
peak was associated with a high incidence of norovirus. Although fewer in number, rotavirus infections 
were more likely to occur in the Spring, whereas in warmer months reports were more likely to be 
linked to foodborne transmission, notably Salmonella. 
In 76 of the 279 suspected outbreaks (27.2%) no specimen was logged to the incident number (see 
Table 2). When specimens were received the median number per outbreak was 4, with a range of 1 to 
121. In this study the detection of two or more patients in a suspected outbreak with an 
indistinguishable organism was considered sufficient to signify microbiological cause. Using this 
definition a microbial cause was found in 96 (34.4%) of the outbreaks. In over one-third of incidents 
(107/279; 38.4%) either none or only one positive specimen was found and no cause could be 
confirmed. Norovirus was the most common organism identified (53/279; 19.0%) with elderly patients 
in either hospital or nursing/residential homes being particularly at risk. Rotavirus was identified in 13 
(4.7%) outbreaks with the elderly or very young being the most likely targets. Salmonellas were 
isolated in 15 outbreaks (5.4%), with 14 of these being linked to social events (wedding receptions or 
meals in hotels, restaurants or public houses). Three outbreaks were linked to E. coli O157 infection. 
More than one agent was found in six outbreaks (possibly due to the simultaneous detection of a past 
infection) and, of these, four involved C. difficile toxins and norovirus, one was C. difficile and 
rotavirus and the remaining one was norovirus and adenovirus.. Astrovirus was found in eight 
suspected outbreaks but in each case only one positive patient was identified and given the outbreak 
definition no outbreak linked to this virus was confirmed. 
Almost half of the outbreaks identified (137/279; 49.1% see Table 2) occurred in residential/nursing 
homes. In 33 (24.1%) of these no specimens were received and in the others when specimens were 
submitted the median number per outbreak was 4, with a range of 1 to 17. With one exception (see 3.3 - 
outbreaks for which an outbreak control team was established) an outbreak control team was not set up 
for these incidents, however, a member of the HPU team did investigate, recommend control measures, 
as necessary, and produce a summary report. When a cause was established, the vast majority were due 
to norovirus, however, five (all in the Spring season) were associated with rotavirus. Fifty-one 
outbreaks were recorded in hospitals during the three year period. In 12 of these no specimens were 
submitted and in another 17 none or only one positive sample was identified. The median number of 
specimens received was 6 with a range from 2 to 121. Again norovirus was the most common cause (14 
outbreaks), and C. difficile toxin (alone or in combination) was recorded in 9 outbreaks and rotavirus in 
three. Of 31 outbreaks linked to social occasions, salmonellas were identified as the most likely cause. 
One outbreak was due to C. perfringens. The distribution of outbreaks for the other locations is given 
in Table 2. Of the 60 incidents recorded, in 25 no specimens were received and a cause was identified Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 6          
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in 15 (25%) with E. coli O157 being found in three of them (see 3.3 - outbreaks for which an outbreak 
control team was established and Table 3). 
Table 2. Etiological agents/organisms identified in reported outbreaks recorded in the 
ILOG system, Middlesbrough Microbiology Laboratory, 2003-2005. 
Location  Number  Specimens 
Cause 
1 
Salmonella  C. difficile  Norovirus  Rotavirus 
Other 
(state) 
None 
found 
2 
Hospital  51  12  0  9  14  3  0  17 
Residential  137  33  0  4  31  5  2  64 
Nursing              (Trichuris) 
(Adenovirus
) 
 
Child care  30  10  1  0  3  5  0  11 
Adult day 
care 
5  3  0  0    0  0  2 
Social event  31  6  15  0  3  0  1  6 
School  14  8  0  0  0  0  0  6 
Retail 
premises 
3  0  1  0  0  0  1 
(E. coli 
O157) 
1 
Private 
Residence 
2  0  0  0  2  0  0  0 
Workplace  2  2  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Other
3  4  2  0  0  0  0  2 
(both E. coli 
O157) 
0 
Total  279 
4  76  17  13  53  13  6  107 
1 Agent/organism detected in two or more patients; 
2 None found signifies that an agent was found in 
none or only one of the patients linked to the incident; 
3 Location not matched to any of the other 
specified categories; 
4 In 6 of the 279 outbreaks more than one agent was detected in two or more 
patients 
Of the 279 outbreaks only 11 were identified as probably foodborne. In three more the evidence 
pointed towards contaminated food but no specific item could be identified. One outbreak was linked to 
untreated water and another two were associated with contaminated kitchen equipment.  
3.3. Outbreaks in the Community for which an Outbreak Control Team was Established 
During the study period outbreak control teams were established to investigate 21 outbreaks in the 
local community (Table 3). Salmonella enteritidis figured prominently and this species was responsible Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 6          
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for 12 incidents. The largest was linked to a Chinese-style buffet restaurant (138 confirmed cases) and 
was the first phage type 56 outbreak to be reported in England. Two outbreaks, separated by a period of 
almost four months, and attributed to S. enteritidis phage type (PT) 14b was linked to the consumption 
of prawn toast from one supplier [7]. The product, supplied frozen and raw, contained imported egg 
and was positive for the same phage type. Eggs may have also been the source in a nursery outbreak of 
S. enteritidis PT4; however, person to person transmission was also evident among the children. Two 
outbreaks, separated by almost a year, occurred in one restaurant. Both were due to S. enteritidis, albeit 
of different phages types and both were thought to be linked to the preparation of tortillas using shell 
eggs. A recommendation to use pasteurized egg made after the first outbreak had not been 
implemented. Of the three E. coli O157 outbreaks, one was linked to a school visit to an open farm, one 
was associated with untreated water at a caravan site and the third was linked to the consumption of 
cooked meats from a butchers shop. In this case isolates from the raw meat scales and from the till 
keypad were indistinguishable from the human strains. The single outbreak due to C. perfringens was 
typical in that a large quantity of food, a chicken curry, was not properly reheated prior to serving. A 
strain, indistinguishable from the human cases, was isolated from a sample of the curry. An unusual 
outbreak linked to whipworm occurred in a small residential home for adults with severe learning 
difficulties. This may have been due to faecal contamination of the garden and subsequent eating of 
contaminated soil by some of the residents. 
Table 3. Community-based outbreaks reported to Middlesbrough Microbiology Laboratory 
for which an outbreak control team was established, 2003 to 2005. 
 
Location  Organism as(type) 
Cases 
Confirmed 
Cases At risk 
Hypothesis 
Cause/contributory 
factor 
Restaurant  S. typhimurium  16  unknown  unknown  
Buffet  S.enteritidis (56)  138  unknown  poor practices 
Open farm  E.coli O157 (RDNC 1)  2  unknown  animal contact 
Restaurant  S.enteritidis (4)  5  unknown  possible salad items 
Tapas bar  S.enteritidis (1)  22  unknown  possible eggs 
Restaurant  S.enteritidis (1)  10  unknown  unknown 
Caravan park  E.coli O157 (21/28)  6  175  private water supply 
Butchers   E.coli O157 (21/28)  11  unknown  cross contamination 
of cooked meats 
Delicatessen  S.typhimurium (104)  107  unknown  possibly chicken 
Tapas bar  S.enteritidis (4)  5  250  possible eggs 
Adult care home   Trichuris 
trichiura 
4  7  contaminated soil 
 
Wedding reception  S.enteritidis (14b)  4  75  prawn toast 
Concert  Norovirus  2  400  person to person Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 6          
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Table 3. Cont. 
Buffet meal  S.enteritidis (14b)  6  93  prawn toast 
 
 
       
Community  Cryptosporidium 
parvum 
13  unknown  possible open farm 
visit 
Buffet meal  Clostridium 
perfringens 
4  120  chicken curry 
Nursery  S.enteritidis (4)  13  120  possible egg and 
case to case 
Take-away business  S.enteritidis (4)  4  unknown  eggs likely 
Restaurant  S.enteritidis (4)  11  unknown  possible cross-
contamination 
Restaurant  S.enteritidis (6)  3  unknown  unknown 
Take-away business  S.enteritidis (4)  6  unknown  eggs likely 
 
3.4. Discussion 
This study used a database as a tool for the retrospective analysis of outbreaks. The database enabled 
all records to be held in one place with the facility that new information could be easily added. Linking 
the ILOG number to the laboratory computer system also enabled microbiology test results to be 
included. One limitation is that the system depends upon one or more individuals voluntarily notifying 
the authorities in order to begin the process and, given that most cases of gastroenteritis are self-limited 
this probably accounted for the low rate of ascertainment. The information is also not always timely 
thereby increasing the difficulty of obtaining relevant epidemiological information and collecting 
specimens from those that were ill. Wider distribution of the database beyond the small group of 
specialists currently involved may enhance the value of the system.  
We found that very few specimens were submitted to the laboratory in relation to the number of 
people experiencing symptoms. In point-source outbreaks late reporting could account for fewer 
specimens being submitted, as many cases would have recovered prior to notification, however, person 
to person spread played a major part in many of the outbreaks described here and therefore timing was 
not the only reason for few specimens being received. Whereas sampling of all ill cases in large 
outbreaks might overwhelm limited laboratory resources, the evidence here suggests that, even in 
larger outbreaks, sampling rates remain low. We found that in more than a quarter of the outbreaks no 
sample was logged. In order to increase specimen submission, both persons ill and the general 
practitioners treating them should consider two questions. First, are there others with a similar illness 
occurring at the same time, and secondly, have foods been eaten outside the home in the previous seven 
days e.g. from a restaurant or take-away premises or after attending a social function where food was 
served. An affirmative answer to one of these questions should prompt collection of a specimen and the 
recording of this highly relevant information on the request form. In this study we did not have Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 6          
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information on incidents that were confined to one household, however, we recognize that outbreaks in 
the domestic setting are undoubtedly common and contribute to the overall picture of outbreaks.  
Initially we were surprised that so few foodborne outbreaks were identified. However, outbreaks in 
long-term care were the most common and the vast majority of these appear to be spread person to 
person rather than linked to food preparation or consumption. We cannot rule out, however, that food 
did not play some part in those outbreaks for which no foodborne link could be established. Stopping 
outbreaks in care facilities is particularly difficult and early recognition and prompt action is needed. 
Recent guidelines [8] emphasise key issues, notably a written policy (with access to advice at all 
times), isolation of infected residents, availability of additional care staff, good hand-washing practices, 
and early reporting to HPUs. It may well be that all these cannot be achieved within current resources 
and that, without substantial cost increases, these incidents remain very difficult to control effectively. 
 Using our outbreak definition of two or more laboratory-confirmed cases we identified a microbial 
cause in approximately one-third of the outbreaks reported. A recent one-year intensified study in The 
Netherlands [9] identified a pathogen in 54% of outbreaks. Their outbreak definition was the 
occurrence of diarrhoea and/or vomiting in at least five cases with some common factor. As here 
noroviruses were the most common cause. The higher rate of detection of noroviruses in the Dutch 
study (55.2% compared to 19% here) may be partly linked to a more sensitive detection method ( PCR 
performed in the national reference institute compared to routine EIA in a clinical laboratory) and also 
to their special effort to examine stool specimens from at least five ill patients in each outbreak. The 
frequent association between noroviruses and outbreaks is linked to their high infectivity and the short-
lived immunity to them [10]. Like others we found that Campylobacters were commonly identified 
pathogens but none was reported as part of an outbreak. The reasons for this are unclear as there is 
plenty of evidence showing that Campylobacters may be transmitted by a variety of foods, water and 
the environment, however, most infections, despite a relatively low infectious dose, remain sporadic or 
affect the members of one household only [11]. C. difficile was frequently isolated from cases of 
diarrhea, however, the high background levels, particularly in wards or homes for the elderly, can make 
it difficult to identify this organism as a cause of outbreaks [12]. It is clear, however, that C. difficile 
can cause serious outbreaks in debilitated patients [13]. In this study about one-third of routine 
salmonella notifications were proven to be part of outbreaks. Undoubtedly some outbreaks were missed 
e.g. a significant number of isolates were from people returning from holidays abroad, from whom no 
further details were available, and therefore the proportion of Salmonella infections matched to 
outbreaks is likely to be an underestimate. 
 This study supports the need for new surveillance systems to provide a more effective outbreak 
detection system [14]. Syndromic surveillance systems are being used to try and capture data from 
changes in behaviour that might indicate the early stages of an outbreak [15]. Unfortunately, because in 
most people, gastrointestinal infections are self-limiting and, symptoms disappear quickly, the majority 
do not change their behaviour in such a way that would trigger the surveillance system. However in 
some sections of the community, notably children, changes in practice are more likely to be seen. 
Systems that utilize the speed and availability of the Internet are being introduced. An automated 
laboratory based system has been established in the Netherlands that is updated daily [16]. In the 
Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases (ProMED-mail) [17], reports are screened, verified and 
then posted on the Internet. Rapid dissemination is also achieved via the Enter-net and Salm-gene Int. J. Environ. Res. Public Health 2009, 6          
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databases [18]. All these systems are intended for international monitoring and depend on laboratory 
confirmation as the source of information. The Internet, however, has been used for rapid reporting of 
local outbreaks. The RUsick2 Foodborne Disease Forum is a web-based system that encourages people 
with illness to contact a website and record information about their illness. The site is always open, 
information can be updated at any time, and is claimed to be user friendly. Operators look for common 
links between patients and then notify appropriate local health professionals Measures are in place to 
control bogus reports that may be either deliberate or suggested by reading other entries. A pilot study, 
admittedly actively supported by a publicity campaign, showed more than a four-fold increase in 
reporting [19]. Recent government figures [20] indicate that nearly two-thirds of adults in the UK 
access the Internet. Those without web access could enter data via a receptionist at a doctor’s surgery, 
however, in practice this is less likely to happen. Perhaps one limiting factor is the newness of this 
approach with people being either unwilling to share information over the Internet or being concerned 
about the lack of human intervention. People may be embarrassed by a request for the collection of 
faeces for laboratory testing and, unless symptoms are particularly severe, would rather wait until better 
rather than involve the public health agencies or their local doctor. 
4. Conclusions  
This study has highlighted the limitations of the current identification system for general outbreaks 
of gastrointestinal disease in the Tees Valley and County Durham areas of England. In many incidents 
investigation was limited by the small number of specimens logged to an outbreak and in 76 of the 279 
reported incidents no specimen was logged at all. In order to improve the recognition of outbreaks, both 
those that are ill and the general practitioners who are looking after them need to appreciate the 
importance of laboratory testing as part of outbreak investigation. Better control measures in care 
homes are needed. Inevitably the current systems fail to pick up some outbreaks and complementary 
approaches are needed to improve outbreak surveillance. The speed and availability of the Internet is 
suggested as one way of enhancing data collection. 
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